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Abstract 
As the process of population ageing in Europe carries on and the retirement age rises, the 
relationship between age and productivity becomes increasingly important. There is concern 
that as the average age of the working individual goes up, the average rate of productivity 
growth will go down, resulting in the decreasing competitiveness of European economies. 
Furthermore, it could be expected that owing to serious differences in the labour market 
structures between the new member states (including current candidates) and the EU-15, the 
former are likely to be among the first countries to experience higher than average productivity 
costs owing to an ageing workforce in the near future. This report examines this hypothesis.  
The research strategy applied in this study is based on the assumption that, in general, wages are 
correlated with productivity at the individual level and as such can be used as a proxy for 
productivity. Such an assumption is quite risky and can be easily criticised. Hence, based on the 
results of earlier studies, the main empirical analysis is limited to groups of workers for which it 
can be expected that the correlation between productivity and wages remains substantial.  
Bearing in mind all these caveats, the results of the analysis show that the relative productivity 
of older workers in the new member states is lower than it is in the EU-15.  
                                                      
* Mateusz Walewski is a researcher at the Centre for Social and Economic Research (CASE) in Warsaw, 
one of the member institutes participating in the AIM consortium.  
Contents 
 
1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................1 
2. Some  theory..........................................................................................................................2 
3.  Why might the productivity of older workers be lower in the NMS?..................................3 
4.  Basic empirical results..........................................................................................................5 
5.  Looking for differences between the EU-15 and the NMS................................................10 
6.  Analysis of individual countries.........................................................................................12 
7.  Analysis of the selected group of employees .....................................................................13 
8.  Relative supply and employment rates of the older labour force.......................................15 
9.  Summary and conclusions..................................................................................................17 
References...................................................................................................................................19 
 
 | 1 
DIFFERENCES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS OF OLDER 
WORKERS IN THE EU – A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF 
THE AGE–WAGE RELATIONSHIP 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 49/April 2008 
Mateusz Walewski 
1. Introduction   
As the process of population ageing in Europe carries on and the retirement age rises, the 
relationship between age and productivity becomes increasingly important (Carone et al., 2005). 
There is concern that as the average age of the working individual goes up, the average rate of 
productivity growth will go down, resulting in the decreasing competitiveness of European 
economies. There are a number of studies that attempt to assess the relationship between age 
and productivity and the shape of the age–productivity curve (see for example Skirbekk, 2003). 
This research report, however, does not try to answer questions concerning the existence of the 
productivity decline with age or its extent. More specifically, it aims at showing that the process 
as such may not be homogenous across Europe.  
The initial expectation here is that the EU’s new member states (NMS)
1 will be among the first 
countries to experience higher than average productivity costs owing to an ageing workforce in 
the near future. This likelihood may stem from major differences in labour market structures 
between these countries (including current candidates) and the EU-15. The convergence process 
results in rapid restructuring and technological change, leading to progressively more human-
capital intensive jobs, yet the current education level and continuous learning participation of 
the older labour force is much lower in the NMS than it is in the EU-15. It can be surmised that 
the lower (average) employment rates of older workers in the NMS are a manifestation of these 
processes.  
The aim of this research is twofold. First, it examines the hypothesis that older workers in the 
NMS are currently less productive (in relation to their younger counterparts) than those in other 
EU member states. Second, this study attempts to find evidence that this productivity gap, if 
present, influences the current employment rates of older workers in the NMS. If both of these 
assumptions are true, and if structural differences between the labour markets of the NMS and 
the EU-15 continue for the next several years, there could be serious consequences for the NMS 
with respect to their ability to meet the employment targets of the Lisbon strategy. These trends 
may equally result in lower overall productivity gains, limiting the GDP growth potential of 
these countries and therefore of the EU as a whole. 
                                                      
1 Reference is made here to the 10 countries that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, and 
especially to 8 of them (excluding Malta and Cyprus). The EU-15 refers to the 15 EU member states 
before this date. 2 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
The research strategy applied in this study is based on the assumption that, in general, wages are 
correlated with productivity at the individual level and as such can be used as a proxy for 
productivity. Such an assumption is quite risky and can be easily criticised. Hence, based on the 
results of earlier studies, the main empirical analysis is limited to groups of workers for which it 
can be expected that the correlation between productivity and wages remains substantial.  
Bearing in mind all these caveats, the results of the analysis show that the relative productivity 
of older workers in the NMS is lower than it is in the EU-15. The study also finds some 
evidence that the lower employment rates of older workers in the NMS are related to these 
productivity differences. Employment rate differences within the NMS and the EU-15 can be 
held to depend on wage arrangements.  
The report is organised as follows: section 2 provides some theoretical considerations 
concerning the age–productivity relationship. Section 3 tries to explain why the NMS are 
expected to suffer from a lower relative productivity rate of older workers than the EU-15. 
Sections 4 to 7 present the results of the empirical analysis and section 8 attempts to relate the 
age–productivity differences of older workers to the employment rate. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Some  theory 
This study is devoted to the widely discussed issue of the productivity decline of older workers 
and its consequences for total productivity dynamics in the face of an ageing population. This 
issue continues to be prominent in economic literature. 
Productivity can decline with age for numerous reasons. The economic (and medical) literature 
has devoted the majority of its attention to the two most distinct phenomena: diminishing 
physical abilities (see Kleemeier, 1954; Shephard, 1999; and Ilmarinen et al., 1997) and 
declining cognitive abilities (see Greller & Simpson, 1999; Park, 1994). The lack of physical 
abilities and to an even larger extent cognitive abilities can be easily overcome by accumulated 
working experience, often resulting in a better quality of the work performed (see Czaja & 
Sharit, 1998). Conversely, as Keyfitz (1984) suggested, in an era of rapid changes, less depends 
on the accumulation of experience than on its discard and replacement.  
In general, therefore, it may be expected as suggested by Skirbekk (2003) that the loss of 
productivity with age will be more pronounced in jobs where performance depends more on 
physical power and the speed of working, learning and problem-solving, and less so in jobs 
where experience and verbal skills are more important. This expectation implies that a 
productivity decline with age is not homogeneous: it can depend on numerous factors such as 
the level, quality and adequacy of education, the specific characteristics of industries and jobs, 
and the pace of technological change. Since countries differ with respect to all of these factors, 
the ageing effect on productivity will not be the same across countries.  
For example, current and future education levels depend on previous/current schooling 
participation, while the quality and adequacy of education depend on the quality of the 
curricula. The productivity decline will probably be more acute in countries with more 
developed or with currently more rapidly developing high-tech industries (see Daveri & 
Meliranta, 2006), since the pace of technological change depends on numerous country-specific 
factors. These factors include the dynamics of the industrial structure, the degree of openness of 
the economy and its changes, the current level of technological progress (owing to technological 
convergence) and possibly many others. 
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In order to better illustrate the possible mechanics behind the age–productivity relationship, let 
us consider the simple human capital wage/productivity model based on that applied in 
Neumark & Taubman (1994):  
wt = -kt + β(Ht – δt)  (1) 
where wt stands for wage at time t, being in this model equal to productivity and kt is the effort 
put into acquiring new knowledge instead of working, i.e. the value of human capital investment 
in time t and comes into the model with a negative sign. Ht is the human capital accumulated 
until time t (knowledge and experience) that is positively influencing performance and δt is the 
depreciation of human capital in time t.  
Now let us assume that 
kt=k(t) and k’(t) ≤ 0 and k’’(t) > 0 and lim∞k(t)=0 (2) 
Ht= ∫ktdt => dHt/dt = kt (3) 
δt = δ(t) and δ’(t) ≥ 0 and  δ’’(t)>0 and lim∞ δ(t)= ∞ (4) 
Differentiating (1) in respect to (t) we obtain 
dwt/dt = -dkt/dt + β(kt – dδ/dt) (5) 
The shape of the age–productivity profile as described by (5) depends, in this simple model, on 
the relation between kt, k’(t) and δ’(t). In the special case of a constant (or zero) depreciation of 
knowledge/human capital, the age–productivity profile strictly increases as in the original 
version of this model used in Neumark & Taubman (1994). In other cases, the age–productivity 
profile increases at the beginning of the career and depends mainly on how much we learn (kt) 
and how quickly we switch from learning to working (dkt/dt), since knowledge depreciation at 
the beginning of the career is expected to be rather slow.  
Yet, from the standpoint of this study, it is much more interesting to consider what is going on 
at the end of the career. If, at this stage of the career, both kt and (dkt/dt) are already small, the 
speed of knowledge depreciation (dδ/dt) plays a decisive role in shaping the age–productivity 
curve. The more rapidly knowledge depreciates, the faster one’s productivity declines. The only 
way to overcome this accelerating knowledge depreciation is to continue learning, i.e. to keep kt 
large and consequently, keep dkt/dt small.
2 If that is not the case, the incentives to retire are 
increased by the lower chances of having a well-paid job at older ages. 
3.  Why might the productivity of older workers be lower in the NMS? 
Taking the above into account, it seems that the NMS are likely to be among the first countries 
to experience a higher than average productivity cost as a result of an ageing workforce in the 
near future.  
During the last several years, the NMS have been experiencing the swift structural reform of 
their economies accompanied by the related technological change (supposedly more rapid than 
in other EU countries), i.e. (dδ/dt) is relatively large there. These processes are not likely to 
abate in the near future since the structure of the NMS economies and their technological 
advancement still differ from EU and OECD averages.  
                                                      
2 For the sake of simplicity, we abstract here from the real effectiveness of the learning process, which at 
first depends on the quality of the education curricula and also tends to decrease with age (with declining 
cognitive abilities).  4 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
Nor do the NMS seem able to overcome this problem by increased kt. The participation rates in 
continuous education in these countries are much lower than in the EU-15. Only about 10-20% 
of employees participate in continuous vocational training activities in Estonia, Poland and 
Hungary, whereas the lowest share for the EU-15 is 26% in Italy. Similar proportions can be 
observed if the share of the working age population participating in any educational activity is 
taken into account. Hungary has the lowest rates of participation, with only 4.4% of the 
population aged 55-64 continuing to learn, whereas in the EU-15 this share varies from 22% (in 
the UK) to 35% (in Italy).  
Figure 1. Participation in education activities in selected NMS and EU-15 countries 
 
Note: CVT refers to continuous vocational training. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Participation in continuous learning is not only below average, but also in some NMS the 
average level of the acquired formal education of the labour force is slightly below the OECD 
average (OECD, 2005). Yet it is not just the level of education that determines the productivity 
of a worker. It is partly (if not mainly) the quality of the education curricula. Comparative 
studies on the quality of education seem to suggest that, currently, there are quality deficiencies 
in the educational systems of some NMS (OECD, 2005). One might suspect – although because 
of the lack of data it is impossible to verify the hypothesis – that similar differences likewise 
existed in the past, which would result in the lower relative productivity of older workers.  
The labour market statistics in the NMS also suggest that the productivity of the older labour 
force in these countries may be lower than that of the EU-15. In most of the NMS, 
systematically lower labour-market participation rates can be observed for the older population 
than the OECD average (OECD, 2006). This outcome may be the static effect of the relatively 
low level of productivity of older workers in the NMS for all the above-mentioned reasons. If 
this is true, then it should be observable in the data. Furthermore, it can also be expected that 
this productivity gap will remain in the future, and, as a result, that participation rates either will 
not converge or will converge very slowly on the OECD average.  
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4. Basic  empirical  results 
The research strategy in this study is based on the assumption that in general, wages are 
correlated with productivity at the individual level and, as such, can be used as a proxy for 
productivity. Obviously, such an assumption is quite bold and may be criticised based on the 
results of numerous studies proving that the wages of older workers in general tend to exceed 
their respective productivity levels (see for example Lazear, 1981; Hellerstein & Neumark, 
2004; and other studies cited by the OECD, 2006).  
Yet there is also evidence that wages are correlated with productivity for some specific 
categories of workers, mainly those working in basic industries and jobs requiring less skill 
(Daveri & Meliranta, 2006; Hellerstein & Neumark, 1995). In addition, it seems that wages rise 
more steeply with age for highly educated staff (OECD, 2006), which suggests that the problem 
of a seniority premium is less pronounced among those with lower qualifications. Some earlier 
studies indicate that high wages for older workers are related to their longer working tenures for 
a single employer; therefore, wages can be better proxies for a productivity decline related to 
ageing when controlling for working tenure. Based on this evidence, apart from estimating the 
age–wage curves for the general population of workers, an estimation is also made of the age–
wage curves for workers characterised by a low education level (general secondary at most), 
performing simpler tasks (ISCO 5 and above) and who work in competitive sectors of the 
economy (construction, manufacturing and market services). It is assumed that for these 
categories of workers, age–wage profiles closely reflect unobservable age–productivity profiles. 
Using these estimated proxies for the age–productivity profiles, the analysis shows that in the 
NMS, the productivity of unskilled workers begins to fall earlier than it does in the EU-15. And 
while the age–productivity profiles are flatter in all the NMS than in the EU-15, the lower age of 
maximum earnings results in a lower average rate of relative productivity of older workers in 
comparison with workers in their prime or younger workers. Furthermore, preliminary evidence 
reveals that the lower relative productivity of the older unskilled workers results in a lower 
relative employment rate of this group in the NMS.  
This study also examines micro data from six European countries: three from the EU-15 
(Germany, Italy and the UK) and three from the NMS (Estonia, Hungary and Poland). One of 
the EU-15 countries analysed, Italy, also belongs to the group of southern European countries. 
The set of countries analysed is strictly related to the availability of data (Table 1 shows details 
of the datasets used).  
Table 1. Data used and their characteristics 
Country  Name of dataset  Year  Number of observations 
available for modelling 
(full-time workers willing 
to disclose their earnings) 
Wage variable used  
(in Natural Logarithms) 
Estonia (NMS)  Labour Force Survey  2004  5,158  Net wage in main job 
Germany  
(EU-15) 
German Socio-Economic Panel  2005  6,050  Net income last month in 
the main job 
Hungary (NMS)  Labour Force Survey  2004  5,323  Net monthly income in the 
main job 
Italy (EU-15)  IPSOS survey of Italian 
households’ income and wealth 
2004 4,821  Annual net income from 
main employment in 2004 
Poland (NMS)  Labour Force Survey  2004  34,197  Net monthly income in the 
main job 
UK (EU-15)  Labour Force Survey  2005  13,102  Gross hourly pay in the 
main job 
Source: Author’s compilation. 6 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
The model specifications across countries hardly differ, with minor differences stemming 
primarily from variations in definitions and coding between datasets. In all cases, the log-linear 
empirical wage model of the following form has been estimated.  
ln(w) = α1+ α2(a) + α3(a
2)+α4(t)+α5(e)+α6(g) + α7(p) + α8(s) + e 
where w stands for wage, a for age, t for tenure, e for the highest level of education obtained, g 
for gender, p for the ISCO profession (at the single-digit level) and s for the sector of economy 
of the current employer and e for the error term. All variables with the exception of age and 
tenure have been expressed as dummies.  
The model has been estimated only for full-time employees and the (log of) net wages in the 
main job has been used as the dependent variable. The UK is the only country for which gross 
rather than net wages have been used, because of data limitations.  
Apart from estimating the wage model for the full sample, estimations have also been run for 
various groups of employees, assembled by their profession, level of education and sector of 
employment. The most interesting results with respect to this study are the resulting shapes of 
the age–wage curves (as described by the parameters α2 and α3) in each country and for the 
cases analysed.  
A summary of the results of these estimations is presented in Table 2. It compares selected 
characteristics/parameters of the age–wage curves for various groups of workers in the countries 
analysed.  
1)  The age at which the maximum wage is recorded indicates the general ‘location’ of the 
age–wage curves on the age scale. The lower the maximum is, the more that younger 
workers are demanded in a given market. Later, this is referred to as the age of maximum 
earnings. 
2)  The age at which earnings are the same as at age 30 (the baseline age) illustrates the 
relative position of older workers in the labour market in comparison with younger ones. 
The lower this age is, the older workers are discriminated against. This parameter depends 
on both the age of maximum earnings and the slope of the curve after the maximum. 
Later, this is referred to as the point of return.  
3)  The last parameter is the relation of the maximum wage to the wage at the age of 30. It 
illustrates the slope of the curve between age 30 and the maximum, i.e. the difference in 
earnings between someone who has just finished his/her apprenticeship and an 
experienced worker at the top of his/her career. Later in the text, this is referred to as the 
earnings distance. 
The age of 30 has been selected as the baseline point of the analysis, as it is assumed to be an 
average kick-off point of a career. Obviously, the choice of this point is completely arbitrary. 
For example, in a study by the OECD (2006), the age group 25-29 is selected as the baseline. 
Changing this point will obviously alter the absolute values of parameters 2 (age of maximum 
earnings) and 3 (earnings distance), but it will not change the shape of the age–wage curves as 
such, i.e. it will not change the results of the analysis. DIFFERENCES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS OF OLDER WORKERS IN THE EU | 7 
* ISCO codes are defined as 1) legislators, senior officials and managers; 2) professionals; 3) technicians and associate professionals; 4) clerks; 5) service workers, shop  
and market sales workers; 6) skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 7) craft and related trade workers; 8) plant and machine operators and assemblers; and 9) elementary occupations. 
Table 2. Selected parameters of age–wage profiles in analysed countries for selected groups of employees 
  ISCO codes (professions)* 
C o l u m n  12345   6789
  All employed ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4  ISCO 5 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
Age of maximum earnings   
Estonia 31.7 Dec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 33.3 36.0 Dec
Hungary   46.5 Inc. n.a. n.a. n.a.  41.6 n.a. 37.4 n.a.
Poland 46.6 64.5 54.7 54.1 46.3 38.6 44.9 41.9 38.6
NMS (analysed) average  41.6 64.5 54.7 54.1 46.3 40.1 39.1 38.4 38.6
Germany 45.3 48.2 49.1 43.7 46.1 41.9 43.1 41.5 41.0
Italy 46.2 57.2 43.4 n.d. 43.5 n.d. n.d. 47.1 n.d.
UK 45.1 47.0 47.3 43.1 46.0 46.4 44.6 43.4 43.6
EU-15 (analysed) average  45.5 50.8 46.6 43.4 45.2 44.1 43.9 44.0 42.3
Age at which earnings are the same as at age 30 (point of return)   
Estonia 33.3 Dec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.6 42.1 Dec
Hungary   63.1 Inc. n.a. n.a. n.a.  53.3 n.a. 44.8 n.a.
Poland 63.2 99.1 79.5 78.3 62.6 47.2 59.7 53.9 47.2
NMS (analysed) average  53.2 99.1 79.5 78.3 62.6 50.2 48.1 46.9 47.2
Germany 60.6 66.5 68.3 57.4 62.1 53.8 56.2 53.0 52.1
Italy 62.4 84.4 56.8 n.d. 57.0 n.d. n.d. 64.1 n.d.
UK 60.2 64.1 64.5 56.1 62.0 62.7 59.3 56.8 57.3
EU-15 (analysed) average  61.1 71.7 63.2 56.8 60.4 58.3 57.7 58.0 54.7
Value of earnings at the maximum, with earnings at age 30=1 (earnings distance) 
Estonia 1.00 Dec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.00 1.01 Dec
Hungary   1.03 Inc. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.03 n.a. 1.01 n.a.
Poland 1.09 1.25 1.33 1.22 1.17 1.03 1.07 1.05 1.02
NMS (analysed) average  1.04 1.25 1.33 1.22 1.17 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.02
Germany 1.13 1.33 1.37 1.11 1.17 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08
Italy 1.13 1.58 1.14 n.d. 1.10 n.d. n.d. 1.14 n.d.
UK 1.15 1.27 1.27 1.13 1.11 1.20 1.10 1.07 1.10
EU-15 (analysed) average  1.13 1.39 1.26 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.09 1.09 1.098 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
Table 2. Continued 
Education  Sector of employment (except agriculture) 
Column 10  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
 Tertiary 
Secondary 
vocational
General 
secondary
Basic 
vocational
Primary 
or below Construction Manufacturing
Market 
services
Non-market 
services
Age of maximum earnings 
Estonia n.a.  Dec. Dec. 36.3 34.4 n.a. 32.4 27.5 n.a.
Hungary   n.a.  45.8 n.a. 39.1 dec n.a. 37.9 43.5 58.0
Poland 51.2  49.0 44.0 41.9 39.1 43.5 50.9 43.6 50.0
NMS (analysed) average  51.2  47.4 44.0 39.1 36.7 43.5 40.4 38.2 54.0
Germany 46.5  43.1 n.d. 45.2 42.9 43.3 45.8 44.3 47.4
Italy  49.8 44.5 45.0 n.d. n.a. 45.0 50.4 45.9 40.8
UK 45.9  42.4 44.9 46.2 44.1 44.9 45.7 44.6 46.3
EU-15 (analysed) average  47.4  43.3 45.0 45.7 43.5 44.4 47.3 44.9 44.8
Age at which earnings are the same as at age 30 (point of return) 
Estonia n.a.  Dec. Dec. 42.6 38.7 n.a. 34.8 30.0 n.a.
Hungary   n.a.  61.5 n.a. 48.3 dec n.a. 45.8 56.9 86.0
Poland 72.4  68.1 58.1 53.9 48.2 57.0 71.7 57.2 70.1
NMS (analysed) average  72.4  64.8 58.1 48.3 43.5 57.0 50.8 48.0 78.0
Germany 63.1  56.2 n.d. 60.4 55.9 56.7 61.6 58.5 64.9
Italy  69.7 59.0 59.9 n.d. n.a. 60.0 70.8 61.8 51.6
UK 61.8  54.8 59.9 62.4 58.3 59.8 61.5 59.2 62.6
EU-15 (analysed) average  64.9  56.6 59.9 61.4 57.1 58.8 64.6 59.9 59.7DIFFERENCES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS OF OLDER WORKERS IN THE EU | 9 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Continued 
Education  Sector of employment (except agriculture) 
Column 10  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
 Tertiary 
Secondary 
vocational
General 
secondary
Basic 
vocational
Primary 
or below Construction Manufacturing
Market 
services
Non-market 
services
Value of earnings at the maximum, with earnings at age 30=1 (earnings distance) 
Estonia n.a.  Dec. Dec. 1.01 1.01 n.a. 1.00 1.00 n.a.
Hungary   n.a.  1.05 n.a. 1.01 dec n.a. 1.01 1.04 1.07
Poland 1.29  1.12 1.08 1.05 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.20
NMS (analysed) average  1.29  1.08 1.08 1.02 1.01 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.14
Germany 1.21  1.14 n.d. 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.16 1.10 1.19
Italy  1.21 1.11 1.12 n.d. n.a. 1.12 1.19 1.13 1.04
UK 1.21  1.09 1.20 1.14 1.10 1.13 1.22 1.16 1.12
EU-15 (analysed) average  1.21  1.11 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.19 1.13 1.12
Notes: Data in italics are not fully comparable across countries; n.a. = not applicable (insignificant age coefficients in wage models); n.d. = no data, such aggregation impossible, Dec. = estimated age–
wage profile was strictly decreasing with age; inc. means that the estimated age–wage profile was strictly increasing with age. The general base category for estimations is male, vocational education, 
ISCO 7, working in manufacturing. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 10 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
 
5.  Looking for differences between the EU-15 and the NMS 
Unweighted averages for a full sample suggest that age–wage curves do not differ significantly 
between the NMS analysed and the EU-15 countries. The age of maximum earnings in Poland 
and in Hungary is similar to the EU-15 average. The point of return in these two countries is 
even later than in any of the EU-15 member states. But the earnings distance for all the NMS is 
lower than in any EU-15 country, indicating much flatter age–wage profiles (see also Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Estimated age–wage profiles for full-time dependent employees in the selected 
countries in 2004 (earnings at the age of 30 are normalised to 1) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on datasets as in Table 2.  
 
The only NMS for which the results for the full sample differ significantly from the EU-15 is 
Estonia. In general, maximum earnings in this country are reached almost at the beginning of an 
individual’s career, at the age of 32. This situation points to a very ‘dynamic’ labour market 
being practically dominated by young workers. The Hungarian case is also very interesting but 
from another perspective. The estimated age–wage profile for Hungary is the flattest of all the 
countries studied. The expected maximum career wage is only 3% higher than the wage at the 
age of 30. The pace at which it decreases afterwards is also extremely slow.  
It could be inferred that the age–wage profiles summarised in column 1 of Table 2 and in Figure 
2 (with the exception of those for Estonia) are strongly influenced by the Lazear effect
3 and thus 
do not mimic age–productivity profiles. Yet it is also widely suggested that this effect is 
especially strong for specific groups of workers and industries: mainly highly educated workers 
employed in skill-intensive and managerial positions (see OECD, 2006). Another possibility is 
that such a wage premium is much higher in the non-market sectors (mainly public), 
                                                      
3 Lazear (1981) demonstrated that it might be efficient from the point of view of employers to keep wages 
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characterised by a hierarchical wage structure in which the career path and the pay ladder are 
very closely tied to work experience and not to observed productivity.  
Therefore, in this study, the age–wage profiles are estimated for specific groups of workers 
grouped according to  
•  profession (columns 2-9 of Table 2), 
•  education levels (columns 10-14 of Table 2) and 
•  sector of employment (columns 15-18 of Table 2). 
Applying such a breakdown enables the observation of further, distinct differences between the 
NMS and the EU-15, although it seems that the differences within these groups are even clearer.  
For the four highest ISCO groups (executives, professionals, technicians and clerks – columns 
2-5 in Table 2), the results for the NMS are unfortunately far from complete. In Hungary, the 
age–wage profiles are horizontal for most groups (insignificant coefficients). For executives 
(ISCO 1), the profile is strictly increasing, suggesting especially high wage premiums for older 
workers. In Estonia, on the other hand, the profiles are also horizontal for all ISCO levels except 
for ISCO 1, where the estimated age–wage curve is strictly decreasing(!).  
While some of the more systematic differences in age–wage profiles between the NMS and the 
EU-15 start to become visible for professions requiring lower skills – ISCO 5 (sales and service 
workers) and below – they are not clear by any means. Age–wage profiles for ISCO 7 and 9 in 
Hungary are horizontal. Once again, in Estonia the age–wage relationship for ISCO 9 is strictly 
negative.  
In general, the results for Poland are quite similar to those of Germany as well as other EU-15 
countries. It is notable, however, that in the case of Poland, both the age of maximum earnings 
and the point of return continue to decrease as we move from complex occupations to more 
elementary ones – they are significantly higher than in Germany for ISCO levels 1-3 and similar 
or lower for ISCO 4 and below. The results for (all) EU-15 countries are much more stable in 
this respect, with the observed difference between Poland and Germany being the most visible 
one between the NMS and the EU-15 for this breakdown.  
A very similar picture is obtained by disaggregating total employment with respect to the 
education levels of employees (see columns 10-14 of Table 2). The lower the education level 
analysed, the more youth-oriented and flat are the age–wage curves in the NMS. For instance, at 
the primary education level in Hungary, the age–wage curve is strictly negative. This tendency 
is not so clear in any of the EU-15 countries.  
Interesting results can also be obtained by analysing the shape of the age–wage curve, 
disaggregated by sectors of the economy. Such an analysis has been performed for six sectors: 
agriculture and fishery, mining, construction, manufacturing, market services and non-market 
services. The latter includes public administration and public services, such as education and 
healthcare (see columns 15-18 in Table 2).  
For all the countries in both the EU-15 and the NMS, the age–wage curves for agriculture and 
mining were horizontal and therefore, these sectors do not appear in Table 2. Horizontal age–
wage curves were also obtained for the construction sector in Hungary and Estonia, and for non-
market services in the latter. For the remaining sectors, there are concave age–wage curves in all 
the analysed countries, which seem to offer additional insight into the characteristics of the age–
wage relationship.  
One can distinguish among three groups of countries for the industrial sector: for Italy and for 
Poland, the age of maximum earnings and the point of return are the highest, and are 12 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
respectively above the ages of 50 and 70 found for Germany and the ages of 45 and 61 for the 
UK. For Estonia and Hungary, the age of maximum earnings is similar and clearly below 40, 
but the point of return already differs significantly between these two countries.
4  
For market services, the differences are slightly more in line with the main country groups. For 
all the NMS, the age of maximum earnings is lower than for any EU-15 country, but the 
difference between Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and Germany and the UK on the other 
is rather small. The age of maximum earnings is clearly the highest for Italy and the lowest for 
Estonia, where it falls below 30.  
For non-market services, the observed differences are also in line with the country groups, but 
they are the opposite of what one would expect. Both the age of maximum earnings and the 
point of return are, in this case, much higher for the NMS (excluding Estonia, which has a 
horizontal curve) than for the EU-15. Moreover, the earnings distance in this sector is highest in 
Poland. This sector is the only one in which the old-age wage premiums in the NMS are clearly 
higher than in the EU-15.  
To summarise, the analysis has been able to identify some differences between the NMS and the 
EU-15. First, for the majority of cases, the age–wage profiles in the NMS are much flatter than 
in the EU-15 (the earnings distance is lower). The results suggest that for qualified workers 
performing complex tasks, particularly in non-competitive sectors, the age premium is higher in 
the NMS (excluding Estonia) than it is in the EU-15. Yet, the age–wage profiles in the NMS 
clearly become more youth-oriented as one moves from more complex to more elementary 
occupations and from higher to lower education levels among workers, as well as from less 
competitive (non-market services) to more competitive (market services) sectors. This outcome 
means that the lower the suspected old-age wage premium, the lower are the relative wages of 
older workers in the NMS. This effect is hardly visible for the EU-15, however. Taken together, 
these findings seem to be in line with the main hypothesis.  
6.  Analysis of individual countries 
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the systematic differences between the EU-15 and NMS 
country groups, and the age–wage curve characteristics in individual countries have been 
mentioned only as far as they represent one of the groups. This section takes a closer look at the 
findings for individual countries that are particularly interesting. 
Estonia definitely has the most youth-oriented labour market. One reaches the maximum 
earnings point at the age of 31 and even younger than 30 for market services. The age–wage 
profile is strictly decreasing not only for elementary occupations and for those with secondary 
education, but also for the ISCO 1 group, i.e. legislators, senior officials and managers. This 
country is the only one with a strictly negative (although insignificant) bivariate correlation 
between the age and wages of employees. It seems that the phenomenon of the old-age wage 
premium simply does not exist in Estonia, and the observed age–wage relationships can be 
assumed to be very well correlated with age–productivity profiles.  
Hungary has the flattest general age–wage profile. The maximum difference for the total age 
spectrum observed, between the expected earnings at the age of 15 and at the age of maximum 
earnings, is 12%, which seems extremely low compared with the country with the largest 
difference, the UK, with an earnings differential of 72%, and even the second lowest (Poland) of 
39%. Hungary is the only country with a strictly increasing age–wage profile for the ISCO 1 
                                                      
4 Similar groupings of country characteristics can be undertaken for the ISCO 8 group, which is primarily 
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group. It is also the country with the most differentiated age–wage profiles across groups of 
employees. One can observe (and Hungary is the only such case) both strictly increasing and 
strictly decreasing age–wage profiles. The age of maximum earnings for the non-market 
services sector is the highest of all the countries studied, whereas for all the other groups the 
results are closer to Estonia than to the EU-15.  
Poland is the NMS country with the general age–wage profile most closely mimicking the 
average profile for the EU-15. Significant differences appear, however, when analysing specific 
groups of employees. For complex professions associated with higher education levels, the age–
wage profiles in Poland indicate a very high old-age premium, much higher than in any EU-15 
country. The same applies to profiles in the non-market services sector, and to some extent in 
the industrial sector. On the other hand, for jobs requiring less education and for the most 
competitive sector of market services, age–wage profiles in Poland indicate low old-age premia 
– significantly lower than in the EU-15. 
The general age–wage profiles in Germany and the UK are quite similar. Some variability of 
results appears for specific groups of workers, but even taking those into account the results in 
the UK and Germany are rather stable across all the groups analysed. The age of maximum 
earnings in Germany varies from 41 to 49.1 and in the UK from 43.1 to 47.3, whereas in 
Poland, for example, it varies from 38.6 to 64.5.  
The Italian case seems to be closest to the NMS as it is also characterised by large differences in 
age–wage profiles among various groups of workers, although they are still much smaller than 
in Poland or even in Hungary. The general age–wage profile in Italy indicates a relatively 
substantial old-age premium: both the age of maximum earnings and the point of return are 
highest in Italy. This result primarily pertains to the more extreme trends favouring older 
workers in the age–wage profiles for ISCO 1 workers and those with tertiary education. It seems 
that age premiums for this kind of worker in Italy are especially high.  
7.  Analysis of the selected group of employees 
As earlier literature on the subject suggests and as the results of this study indicate so far, the 
age–wage profiles for various groups of workers might differ significantly. The variations may 
result from the difference in the magnitude of old-age wage premia and also from the diverse 
shapes of the actual age–productivity profiles. It is also suggested that old-age wage premia can 
be especially high in the case of better-educated employees occupying either more complex jobs 
or higher (managerial) positions. This explanation applies with respect to employees working in 
public or more general non-market sectors, characterised by a rigid wage ladder closely tied to 
the total acquired working experience.  
The primary aim of this analysis is to search for differences in age–productivity profiles 
between the EU-15 and the NMS. Thus, the analysis should be limited to those groups of 
workers for which it is suspected that age–wage profiles are strictly correlated with age–
productivity profiles. Hence, the next stage of the analysis estimates the age–wage profile for 
such a group of workers. The samples are limited in each country to consist solely of workers 
characterised by a maximum of general secondary education, occupying jobs from an 
elementary (ISCO 9) level to service workers (ISCO 5), and employed in the manufacturing, 
construction and market-services sectors.  
All the characteristics of the age–wage profiles indicate systematic differences between the EU-
15 and the NMS, and these differences are in line with the main hypothesis of this research (see 
Table 3 and Figure 3). The age of maximum earnings in all the NMS is lower than in any of the 
EU-15 countries; the same applies to the point of return. For all the NMS, the age–wage profiles 
are also flatter than in the EU-15 (as is the case for the full sample).  14 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
Table 3. Estimated characteristics of age–wage profiles for unskilled workers and relative 
average productivities 
Row  Country 
 
 
(1) 
Age of maximum 
wage
(2)
Point of 
return
(3)
Earnings 
distance
(4)
Relative 
productivity
Pold /Pprime  (%)
(5)
1 Estonia  33.9 37.7 1.00 84.8
2 Hungary  40.3 50.6 1.02 96.6
3 Poland  40.8 51.6 1.04 92.4
4  NMS (analysed) 
  average 
38.3 46.7 1.02 91.3
5 Germany  42.5 55.1 1.07 93.5
6 Italy  46.7 63.4 1.15 100.3
7 UK  45.1 60.2 1.13 97.1
8  EU-15 (analysed)  
  average 
44.8 59.6 1.12 96.9
9 Germany,  East  38.9 47.7 1.03 90.5
10 Germany,  West  45.5 61.1 1.11 98.3
Notes: The age–wage profiles are for workers with a maximum of general secondary education working in 
manufacturing, construction and market services and occupying positions ISCO 9–ISCO 5 (columns 2-4). The 
relative average productivities are for the age group 50-64 in comparison with the age group 25-50 (column 5). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data as in Table 1. 
 
The other general characteristics of the age–wage profiles in individual countries are replicated. 
The Estonian labour market is clearly the most youth-oriented, although in this case, the 
differences between Estonia and the other NMS are much smaller than for the full sample. The 
German age–wage profiles are the most similar to those in the NMS; however, all the 
characteristics still indicate higher relative wages for older workers.  
The similarity of German profiles with those of the NMS can be explained by the heterogeneity 
of the German labour market. East Germany is in fact a transition economy, with a comparable 
labour force (see rows 9-10 of Table 3). The characteristics of age–wage profiles in former West 
Germany are very similar to those in the UK and Italy, while the age–wage profiles in former 
East Germany are similar to those in the NMS.  
The findings of this study, particularly regarding the difference between former East and West 
Germany, suggest that the systematic divergence in age–wage profiles between the NMS and 
the EU-15 cannot result from the variation in institutional settings. First, labour market 
institutions differ significantly within the groups analysed (see for example Riboud et al., 2002) 
and second, labour market institutions do not differ between the eastern and western parts of 
Germany.  
One can also argue that the earlier age of maximum earning and the earlier point of return do 
not necessarily mean that the relative productivity of older workers in the NMS is lower than in 
the EU-15. These outcomes could stem from much flatter age–productivity profiles in these 
countries. 
Hence, applying the results of the estimations, the unweighted average productivities of workers 
in the age groups of 25-49 (Pprime) and 50-64 (Pold) have been calculated. Column 5 of Table 3 
presents the relation of Pold to Pprime (Pold/Pprime) in each country. It is clear that (taking into  
 DIFFERENCES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS OF OLDER WORKERS IN THE EU | 15 
 
account differences between former East and West Germany) the relative productivity of older 
workers in the NMS is lower than in the EU-15. This result is slightly weaker although it still 
holds for Hungary, where the estimated age–productivity profile is flattest.  
Figure 3. Estimated age–wage profiles for workers with a maximum of general secondary 
education, working in manufacturing, construction and market services and 
occupying positions ISCO 9–ISCO 5 
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Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
Assuming that the findings for this selected group of workers (unskilled) are not strongly 
influenced by the old-age wage premium, it can be concluded that they result from real 
differences in the relative productivities of older workers in the NMS and the EU-15. If this 
conclusion is true, it should influence the relative employment rates of the older population. In 
general, employment rates for this group in the NMS should be lower than in the EU-15. This 
issue is analysed below.  
8.  Relative supply and employment rates of the older labour force 
In order to examine the relationship between the relative productivity of the older, unskilled 
labour force and the relative employment rate of this group, one cannot simply calculate 
employment rates and correlate them with relative productivities as in Table 3. The general 
employment level of older workers does not depend solely on relative productivity levels. It is 
influenced by other exogenous factors such as cultural attitudes, features of the pension system 
and the general education structure of the older labour force. 
It might be suspected that in countries characterised by strong family ties, such as Italy or 
Poland, the activity level of the older population may be limited, owing to numerous and not 
necessarily economic reasons – for example, a long tradition of grandparents caring for 
children. A defined-benefit pension system encouraging early retirement will negatively   
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influence the employment rate of older workers. A high share of the unskilled in the total 
population of those aged 50-64 will also limit the total employment rates of this age group, 
disregarding relative productivities.  
Therefore, the interest here is in the relative employment rate of the unskilled older population 
as compared with the total employment rate for the same cohort. If e equals the employment 
rate for the age group 50-64 and eu equals the employment rate for the unskilled (ISCED 0-2) 
belonging to the same age group, then the ‘relative employment rate’ equals eu/e. Figure 4 
presents the relative employment rates for the countries analysed. It is clearly visible that for all 
the NMS, the relative employment rates are lower than they are for the EU-15. This outcome 
seems to indicate that there is a relationship between the relative productivity differences and 
the employment rates of older workers and it coincides with the observed lower employment 
rates for this age group in the NMS.  
Figure 4. Relative employment rate of the unskilled belonging to the age group 50-64 
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Note: If e equals the employment rate for the age group 50-64 and eu equals the employment rate for the 
unskilled (ISCED 0-2) belonging to the same age group, then the relative employment rate equals eu/e. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
Yet it can also be observed that the relative productivity differences and relative employment 
rate differences do not coincide when comparing individual countries within the NMS group 
and within the EU-15 group. This result may be attributed the fact that the age–wage curve 
estimated is only a proxy for the age–productivity relationship, even for the selected group of 
workers.  
If the observed relative wages of older workers are higher than their respective relative 
productivities, this characteristic will obviously decrease their employment rate. This factor may 
explain the relatively lower employment rate in Hungary than in Estonia. In the latter case, the 
age–wage curve indicates a much lower relative productivity of older workers and it may reflect 
the actual age–productivity relationship much more closely than the flat Hungarian age–wage 
profile. The same applies to the relatively high employment rate of the unskilled older DIFFERENCES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS OF OLDER WORKERS IN THE EU | 17 
 
population in the UK.
5 A high relative employment rate of the unskilled older population in 
Poland (higher than in Estonia) can be explained by the large share of employment in 
agriculture in this country.  
9. Summary  and  conclusions 
The main aim of this report has been to examine differences in the productivity of older workers 
in selected EU countries.  
The initial expectation was that the productivity of older workers would be lower in the NMS. 
The faster decline of productivity with age in these countries may stem from two factors: 1) 
rapid technological change related to the swift economic transition, resulting in quicker human-
capital depreciation; and 2) lower rates of participation in continuous learning, additionally 
strengthening the negative impact of the first factor. Similar to the entire EU, the NMS are 
facing accelerating rates of decline in age-related productivity. Thus, the process of labour force 
ageing may result in either lower employment rates of older workers or a negative influence on 
overall productivity (or both) and consequently, GDP growth.  
In order to compare the relationship between age and productivity in the NMS and the EU-15, a 
series of wage models have been estimated for six countries: three belonging to the NMS and 
three to the EU-15. Although there are many arguments based on the Lazear effect that wages 
cannot be used as a proxy for productivity, there are also arguments that this effect tends to be 
weaker for some specific groups of employees – mainly those who occupy more elementary 
jobs and who have lower levels of education. It can also be expected that this effect will be 
weaker as the economic environment becomes more competitive. Based on these assumptions, 
groups of employees have been selected, matching the above characteristics. The age–wage 
relationships estimated for this group have subsequently been treated as a proxy for the age–
productivity relationship.  
The analysis has been able to show that the shape of the age–productivity curve in the NMS 
differs (at least for the unskilled) from that observed in the EU-15 countries. On average, an 
unskilled worker in one of the NMS reaches maximum productivity earlier than in the EU-15. 
The productivity of an older worker also tends to return sooner to the level experienced the 
beginning of his/her career. The average relative productivity level of older unskilled workers 
(aged 50-64) is also lower compared with the productivity of workers in their prime (aged 25-
49) in the NMS than it is in the EU-15.  
The research has moreover been able to show (although the argument here is rather weak) that 
the low relative productivity of unskilled older workers in the NMS negatively influences their 
relative employment rates.  
If these results are correct, the implication is that in the NMS, employment rates are unlikely to 
increase significantly for the large proportion of unskilled (or mis-skilled) workers among the 
older or middle-aged labour force in the near future. In addition to the direct adverse impact on 
total employment rates, this finding has important negative consequences for fiscal tensions 
with respect to increasing spending needs, through either unemployment or social benefits (or 
both) or decreasing incomes, since these expenditures are mainly financed by labour taxes. 
                                                      
5 Obviously, the high wages of older workers can reduce employment because of the negative impact of 
high wages on demand, but on the other hand, one has to take into account their opposite effect on labour 
supply. Here, much depends on the characteristics of the pension system. In this context, the Estonian 
system is also one of the most rigid in the EU with only 6.3% of GDP spent on total pensions in 2003 (the 
EU-25 average was 12.6%) (data derived from Eurostat).  18 | MATEUSZ WALEWSKI 
   
Obviously, this perverse characteristic of the labour supply structure in the NMS will naturally 
weaken because of socio-demographic processes (the cohort effect) and the fact that the 
convergence process is slowing down. It will nevertheless influence the labour market prospects 
of these countries for at least the next several years. The negative effects of these trends could 
be limited by developing an efficient and widespread system of life-long learning and 
vocational training for those currently in their 30s and 40s, and by improving the quality of the 
general education system. It seems that from the viewpoint of the labour market this should be 
the key priority for public spending in the near future. It also appears that the only solution to 
this problem in the short run is to reduce the labour costs of vulnerable groups of workers.   
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European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Bratislava, Slovakia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
SSB    Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway 
SFI    Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
ENEPRI  publications include three series: Research Reports, which consist of papers presenting the 
findings and conclusions of research undertaken in the context of ENEPRI research projects; Working 
Papers, which constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and already published by 
ENEPRI partner institutes on their own account; and thirdly, Occasional Papers (closed series) containing 
a synthesis of the research presented at workshops organised during the first years of the network’s 
existence. 
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